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I. INTRODUCTION 
Over the past two decades, the debate over the proper role of religion 
within public discourse has become a staple of legal and political theory.  Nu-
merous books,2 conference panels,3 and symposia4 have dissected the issue.  The 
discussion has even spilled over into popular commentary (particularly in recent 
  
 
1
 Associate Professor of Law, Cornell Law School.  Thanks to Michael Perry and Steve Shif-
frin for helpful comments and suggestions.  Thanks also to the American Constitution Society and 
the West Virginia University College of Law for sponsoring this conference and for inviting me to 
participate. 
 
2
 See, e.g., CHRISTOPHER J. EBERLE, RELIGIOUS CONVICTION IN LIBERAL POLITICS (2002); AMY 
GUTMANN & DENNIS THOMPSON, DEMOCRACY AND DISAGREEMENT (1996); KENT GREENAWALT, 
PRIVATE CONSCIENCES AND PUBLIC REASONS (1995); MICHAEL PERRY, RELIGION IN POLITICS 
(1997) [hereinafter PERRY, POLITICS]; MICHAEL PERRY, LOVE AND POWER (1991) [hereinafter 
PERRY, POWER]; JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM (1993). 
 
3
 See, e.g., Samuel Freeman, Public Reason and Political Justifications, 72 FORDHAM L. REV. 
2021 (2004) (panel discussion on public reason at a conference on John Rawls). 
 
4
 See, e.g., Symposium, The Role of Religion in Public Debate in a Liberal Society, 30 SAN 
DEIGO L. REV. 643 (1993) (on the role of religion in political discourse). 
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years) in response to the increased power of the Religious Right within the Re-
publican Party and President George W. Bush’s conspicuous religiosity.  Al-
though they disagree over the precise details, proponents of public reason broad-
ly agree that considerations of fairness and social stability counsel in favor of at 
least some constraint of religious argument in the public square.5   
Many critics of the idea of public reason have tended to focus on the 
fairness of restraining public religious arguments.6  Others have pointed to the 
difficulty of distinguishing between public and non-public reasons and of speci-
fying the scope of activities from which non-public reasons are to be excluded.7  
Finally, a number of critics have focused on the role of stability within the pub-
lic reason debate, arguing that religious differences are not an especially grave 
threat to political stability.8   
I am sympathetic with each of these criticisms.  My narrow focus in this 
essay, however, will be on the contested relationship between pluralism and 
stability within the public reason debate.  While I agree with those who have 
questioned the degree to which―in our present circumstances―religious diver-
sity constitutes an especially grave threat to stability, I will go one step farther 
and argue that it is possible that efforts to exclude religious argument through 
restrictive theories of public reason may well constitute the greater threat to 
stability over the long run.   
In Part II, to situate my discussion, I will provide a very brief overview 
of the public reason debate and the menu of positions that different theorists 
have adopted on the question.  Readers who are already familiar with the litera-
ture in this area should skip directly to part III, in which I explore at greater 
length two divergent stories about the relationship between pluralism and stabil-
ity: one scary and the other happy.  The “scary story,” which dominates discus-
sions of public reason, treats pluralism as a threat to stability that must be 
tamed.  In contrast, there has long existed within political theory a more “happy 
  
 
5
 For the most part, discussions of public reason involve discussions of self-restraint in the 
use of religious argumentation, rather than restraints imposed by law.  See GREENAWALT, supra 
note 2, at 4.  When theorists discuss religious argument by government officials, however, they 
often blend discussions of public reason and the Establishment Clause in a way that lends the 
force of law to at least some of the restraint of public reason.  See, e.g., Abner S. Greene, Consti-
tutional Reductionism, Rawls, and the Religion Clauses, 72 FORDHAM L. REV. 2089, 2095-96 
(2004). 
 
6
 See, e.g., STEPHEN L. CARTER, THE CULTURE OF DISBELIEF ch. 11 (1994); EBERLE, supra note 
2, at 17, 140-48; Jurgen Habermas, Religion in the Public Sphere, 14 EUR. J. PHIL. 1, 8-9 (2006); 
David M. Smolin, Regulating Religious and Cultural Conflict in Postmodern America: A Re-
sponse to Professor Perry, 76 IOWA L. REV. 1067, 1077-79 (1991).  
 
7
 E.g., PERRY, POLITICS, supra note 2, at 47; see also DAVID HOLLENBACH, THE GLOBAL FACE 
OF PUBLIC FAITH 170 (2003).  Perry makes a similarly pragmatic, but distinct, argument when he 
observes that the principles that satisfy the demands of some of the more demanding accounts of 
public reason may not be sufficiently determinate to resolve the important debates in which they 
are deployed.  See PERRY, POLITICS, supra note 2, at 57. 
 
8
 See, e.g., EBERLE, supra note 2, at ch. 6; HOLLENBACH, supra note 7, at 160-65; PERRY, 
POLITICS, supra note 2, at 53 n.37 (collecting sources). 
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story” according to which pluralism affirmatively contributes to stability by 
creating incentives for groups to moderate their demands.   
These stories are not, at least as a conceptual matter, mutually exclusive.  
Indeed, it is likely that both are operating to a certain extent within our society.9  
For my purposes, however, the stories should be understood as competing with 
one another to serve as―ultimately―the more apt description of the relation-
ship between pluralism and stability.  Thus, in Part IV, I argue that, given the 
importance of stability to the case for public reason, the question of which story 
is in fact more salient should be central to the discussion of public reason.   
Despite its apparent relevance, however, much of the debate over the 
proper role of religious discourse in public life has proceeded without reference 
to this important―and ultimately empirical―question.  But if the happy story 
proves to be a more accurate description of our reality, restricting public resort 
to religious and deep moral reasons may actually backfire.  If pluralism, on bal-
ance, increases stability and improves the quality of public discourse, restricting 
its expression might cause the very instability and deliberative harm that propo-
nents of public reason hope to avoid.  For those proponents of self-restraint who 
are focused almost exclusively on the fairness of religious arguments or the legi-
timacy of government actions whose advocates resort to religious reasons, these 
potentially harmful consequences of self-restraint in public deliberation will be 
simply a necessary cost of doing the right thing.  But for theorists for whom the 
consequences of restrictive public reason are an important part of its appeal the 
account I offer should at least provide a reason to pause and reconsider the value 
they attach to self-restraint for religious participants in the public conversation. 
II. A BRIEF OVERVIEW OF THE PUBLIC REASON DEBATE  
In light of the sheer volume of scholarship addressing the question of 
public reason, it is virtually impossible to comprehensively describe the range of 
positions theorists have staked out on the issue.  I will therefore limit myself to 
recounting the broad contours of the debate, paying particular attention to John 
Rawls’s extremely influential theory of public reason.  The discussion will of 
necessity be cursory and not capable of conveying the full sophistication of the 
views to which I will refer, but it should provide readers unfamiliar with the vast 
public reason literature with enough of the lay of the land to make sense of the 
argument I set out in Parts III and IV.  In this Part, after discussing the reasons 
scholars have given for limiting the sorts of arguments that ought to be deployed 
in public discourse, I will describe the range of positions they have endorsed 
along four axes of disagreement.  I will then briefly discuss the objections that 
commentators have raised against restricting the use of religious arguments in 
the public square. 
  
 
9
 See generally SCOTT PAGE, THE DIFFERENCE 255 (2007) (describing normative diversity as 
having negative “direct” effects and positive “indirect” effects but suggesting agnosticism about 
which effects predominate). 
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A. Reasons for Restraint 
Arguments for restraining public reason typically emphasize two broad 
themes:  (1) liberal conceptions of fairness and legitimacy and (2) the threat of 
social instability within a pluralist society.10  Although they are not always 
equally emphasized, these two interests often function as interlocking parts of a 
single argument.  Rawls, for example, viewed his discussion of the two ques-
tions as deeply interdependent.  In Political Liberalism, he describes his argu-
ment as proceeding in two steps:  first, he provides a preliminary account of 
public reason within a well-ordered society and, second, he explains how such a 
just society could actually sustain itself.11  While legitimacy and stability can be 
understood as common elements of a single argument for public reason, it is 
useful to distinguish between them for the purposes of this paper, both because 
they are conceptually distinct and because my discussion in the Parts III and IV 
will be narrowly centered on the question of public reason’s complex relation-
ship with stability.12   
1. Legitimacy 
The discussion of fairness as a reason for limiting the content of public 
discourse focuses on the legitimacy of coercive state regulation within a plural-
ist society.  Proponents of public reason rely on the proposition that, in order to 
justifiably limit individual freedom, the state must act only on the basis of rea-
sons that each citizen could reasonably be expected to accept as his own.13  Lib-
  
10
 See RAWLS, supra note 2, at 133-34 (discussing the importance of both legitimacy and sta-
bility in his theory of political liberalism); EBERLE, supra note 2, at 152; John Rawls, The Idea of 
an Overlapping Consensus, 7 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 10 (1987) [hereinafter Rawls, Overlap-
ping Consensus]; John Rawls, The Idea of Public Reason Revisited, 64 U. CHI. L. REV. 765, 770-
71 (1997) [hereinafter Rawls, Public Reason]; see also Ed Wingenbach, Unjust Context:  The 
Priority of Stability in Rawls’s Contextualized Theory of Justice, 43 AM. J. POL. SCI. 213, 220-21 
(1999) (arguing that under Rawls’s Political Liberalism  theory “[i]nsuring cooperation and stabil-
ity becomes the first and only goal of the political conception of justice; social division and possi-
bly war define the alternative.”). 
11
 See RAWLS, supra note 2, at 140-41. 
12
 I do not mean this focus on stability to imply that it is my only concern with restrictive 
accounts of public reason.  For example, I share the views of many of those who have objected to 
public reason on fairness grounds.  See infra Part II.C.  But, as I discuss below, the relationship 
between public reason and stability has, in my view, not been sufficiently explored within the 
existing public reason literature. 
13
 GUTMANN & THOMPSON, supra note 2, at 13-14; see also RAWLS, supra note 2, at 217 
(“[O]ur exercise of political power is proper and hence justifiable only when it is exercised in 
accordance with a constitution the essentials of which all citizens may reasonably be expected to 
endorse in light of principles and ideals acceptable to them as reasonable and rational.”); Bruce 
Ackerman, Why Dialogue?, 86 J. PHIL. 5, 17-18 (1989); Robert Audi, The Place of Religious 
Argument in a Free and Democratic Society, 30 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 677, 688-89 (1993); Gerald F. 
Gaus, The Place of Religious Belief in Public Reason Liberalism, unpublished manuscript on file 
with author, at 3; Stephen Macedo, In Defense of Liberal Public Reason, in NATURAL LAW AND 
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eral theorists understand this conception of legitimacy as an essential compo-
nent of their commitment to a political community that regards citizens as “free 
and equal.”14  Amy Gutmann and Dennis Thompson, for example, argue that the 
demand that political decisions should be “justifiable, as far as possible, to eve-
ryone bound by them” uniquely expresses the reciprocity appropriate when we 
“respect one another as moral agents.”15  Similarly, Thomas Nagel at one time 
argued that political liberalism’s commitment to equality among citizens re-
quires that governmental restraints on action be justifiable from some “imper-
sonal standpoint” and not just from within a citizen’s own particular conception 
of the good.16   
Because modern societies are free, these theorists posit, societies are 
characterized by deep, ineradicable―and ultimately reasonable―disagreement 
about conceptions of the good.17  Proponents of public reason refer to this phe-
nomenon as the “fact of reasonable pluralism.”18  Combining this inescapable 
and reasonable moral and religious disagreement with a view of legitimacy that 
prohibits coercion on grounds that a citizen might reasonably reject yields a 
principle of restraint (the precise contours of which are subject to substantial 
disagreement) limiting the sorts of reasons that can be offered in support of state 
action restricting individual freedom to reasons that are not excluded by any of 
the numerous reasonable conceptions of the good that a citizen might hold.19 
2. Stability 
Although the liberal requirements for legitimacy typically receive more 
attention than questions of stability, I agree with Steven H. Shiffrin that, for 
many theorists of public reason, “what is really driving the [public reason] doc-
  
PUBLIC REASON 11, 35 (Robert P. George & Christopher Wolfe eds., 2000); Rawls, Public Reason, 
supra note 10, at 771; Lawrence B. Solum, Public Legal Reason, 92 VA. L. REV. 1449, 1469 
(2006).   
14
 See Rawls, Public Reason, supra note 10, at 770 (“Citizens are reasonable when, viewing 
one another as free and equal in a system of social cooperation over generations, they are prepared 
to offer one another fair terms of cooperation according to what they consider the most reasonable 
conception of political justice; and when they agree to act on those terms, even at the cost of their 
own interest in particular situations, provided that other citizens also accept those terms.”); see 
also Lawrence B. Solum, Constructing an Ideal of Public Reason, 30 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 729, 
733-34  (1993). 
15
 GUTMANN & THOMPSON, supra note 2, at 13-14. 
16
 See Thomas Nagel, Moral Conflict and Political Legitimacy, 16 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 215, 
229-31 (1987).   However, because of objections to Nagel’s position raised by Joseph Raz in his 
article, Facing Diversity: The Case of Epistemic Abstinence, 19 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 3 (1990), Nagel 
has since abandoned the position he staked out in Moral Conflict and Political Legitimacy.  
GREENAWALT, supra note 2, at 73-74. 
17
 See RAWLS, supra note 2, at 36-40; Rawls, Overlapping Consensus, supra note 10, at 3.  
18
 See RAWLS, supra note 2, at 144; see also GUTMANN & THOMPSON, supra note 2, at 26. 
19
 See RAWLS, supra note 2, at 58-66. 
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trine . . . is fear about the instability effects of religion.”20  As with legitimacy, 
discussions of stability within arguments for restrictive public reason begin with 
the fact of reasonable pluralism regarding values and conceptions of the good.  
But the concern with stability quickly guides theorists in a direction that is far 
more empirical and pragmatic in its orientation than the discussions of legitima-
cy.  The aim of liberal political philosophy, perceived through the lens of stabili-
ty, is not solely the articulation of a theoretically just social order, but also the 
more “practical political goal” of “secur[ing] stability and social unity.”21  It 
seeks to answer the question:  “How is it possible that there may exist over time 
a stable and just society of free and equal citizens profoundly divided by reason-
able though incompatible religious, philosophical, and moral doctrines?”22  
From this view, then, “the problem of stability is fundamental to political phi-
losophy . . . .”23   
The argument that concern for stability counsels in favor of a restrictive 
account of public reason typically presupposes that it is by some shared moral 
commitment―however thin―that pluralist democracies can best ensure their 
survival as going concerns.24  To that end, theorists of public reason often search 
for an “overlapping consensus,” or a shared conception of the fair rules of the 
road on which people can converge within their varying comprehensive concep-
tions of the good.25  They conceive of this overlapping consensus as involving a 
commitment to limit the sphere of permissible government conduct and prohi-
biting the state’s enforcement of one particular conception of the good or system 
of values over others.   
It is in evaluating this consensus with an eye toward the goal of foster-
ing stability that theorists distinguish between a true overlapping consen-
sus―that is, a shared, albeit thin, conception of political justice―and a “mere 
modus vivendi.”26  The former involves a principled commitment by adherents 
of different moral conceptions to uphold the values embodied in the overlapping 
consensus, and is therefore very effective (or so the argument goes) at ensuring 
  
20
 Steven H. Shiffrin, Religion and Progressive Politics 24 (unpublished manuscript).  For a 
very thorough discussion of similar arguments within the Supreme Court's First Amendment 
jurisprudence, see Richard W. Garnett, Religion, Division, and the First Amendment, 94 Geo. L.J. 
1667 (2006). 
21
 John Rawls, Justice as Fairness: Political, Not Metaphysical, 14 PHIL. & PUB. AFF.  223, 
225 (1985). 
22
 RAWLS, supra note 2, at xviii. 
23
 Id. at xvii. 
24
 See Rawls, Overlapping Consensus, supra note 10, at 1 (observing that a crucial aim of 
political philosophy is to present a political conception of justice that can provide a “shared public 
basis for the justification of political and social institutions,” thereby helping to “ensure stability 
from one generation to the next.”); Shiffrin, supra note 20, at 23; Wingenbach, supra note 10, at 
224 (“For [Rawls], the lack of any common doctrine leads to political conflict and disorder, and, 
therefore, the need arises to impose a common but nonmetaphysical doctrine to ensure stability.”).  
25
 See, e.g., RAWLS, supra note 2, at xviii-xix.  
26
 See RAWLS, supra note 2, at 144-50. 
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the requisite stability.27  The latter is inherently unstable―and therefore infe-
rior―because it is not rooted in any shared principles.  As a consequence, it is 
not affirmed for its own sake, but only as a prudential accommodation to prac-
tical necessity that can break down at any moment if the balance of power 
shifts.28 
The notion of public reason enters as a crucial contributor to the stabili-
ty generated by a true overlapping consensus.  An obligation to abide by the 
limitations of public reason in political debate is an expression of citizens’ duty 
to treat each other with respect, one whose exercise reinforces the overlapping 
consensus and the social stability that it engenders.29  By bracketing deep moral 
disagreement, public reason fosters stability by minimizing the possibility that 
political debate will devolve into heated confrontation, and possibly violence.  
Because of the importance of the overlapping consensus and of public reason to 
stability, groups that reject them constitute dangerous threats to that social order.  
As such, they must be contained “like war and disease.”30 
B. Varieties of Restraint 
Theorists have deployed these discussions of legitimacy and stability in 
support of a broad range of substantive conceptions of public reason.  A detailed 
account of the numerous specific theories that have made their appearance in 
this decades long (and still ongoing) debate would take far longer, and be more 
tedious, than most readers would be willing to tolerate.  Accordingly, I will limit 
myself to a cursory recitation of the range of views that have been proposed.  In 
doing so, I will focus on four axes of disagreement:  (1) the content to be ex-
cluded (or required); (2) the actors who are to be bound by the restraints; (3) the 
contexts in which the restraints are to apply; and (4) the nature of the restraints, 
that is, whether the restraints should be understood as exclusive or inclusive. 
In setting forth the content of discourse permitted by their particular 
theories of public reason, scholars have run the gamut.  At the least restrictive 
end of the spectrum, they have focused narrowly on the perceived dangers of the 
specific category of reasons associated with religious belief.  Robert Audi, for 
example, limits his conception of the content excluded by public reason to what 
he calls “religious reasons,” requiring that participants in public discourse offer 
only reasons that are secular in nature.31  A similar, though perhaps broader, 
conception of the content excluded by public reason restricts the use of so-called 
  
27
 See Rawls, Public Reason, supra note 10, at 780; Rawls, Overlapping Consensus, supra 
note 10, at 10. 
28
 See Raz, supra note 16, at 13. 
29
 See RAWLS, supra note 2, at 217. 
30
 Id. at 64 n.19. 
31
 Robert Audi, The Separation of Church and State and the Obligations of Citizenship, 18 
PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 259, 278 (1989).  Indeed, Audi goes even farther and would restrict religious 
motives from public decision-making.  Id. at 284. 
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“nonaccessible” reasons.32  Finally, and most broadly, theorists like Rawls and 
Lawrence Solum would exclude a far greater number of reasons, namely all 
those too closely tied to “controversial” (or “comprehensive” or some other such 
term) conceptions of the good.33  In Rawls’s formulation of this standard, with 
which Solum largely agrees, public reason should be narrowly limited to those 
reasons endorsed by “common sense” and “the procedures and conclusions of 
science when these are not controversial.”34   
It is worth noting that, even within broader accounts of the reasons ex-
cluded by the requirement of publicity, the question of the proper role of reli-
gion within public discourse stands at the foreground.  This is because, under 
any of the formulations of public reason, even those as all-encompassing as 
John Rawls’s, religious discourse qualifies as the nonpublic reason par excel-
lence.  In other words, despite theorists’ disagreements about the precise con-
tours of public reason, they are unanimous in believing that, if anything is to 
count as nonpublic in the relevant sense, religious reasons will fit the bill.35 
Public reason’s champions are also divided over who exactly should be 
restrained by their theories.  Some, such as Rawls in later versions of his posi-
tion, would impose the limits of public reason primarily on government actors, 
or on some subset of state actors in their official capacities.36  Others would 
extend the requirements of public reason to normal citizens, at least under cer-
tain circumstances.37 
As with the question of how to describe the sorts of arguments to be ex-
cluded, scholars differ over the precise contexts in which the restraints of public 
reason should apply.  On the less restrictive end of this spectrum is Rawls, who 
would limit the restrictions to debates and decisions concerning “constitutional 
essential[s] and matter[s] of basic justice.”38  Others would impose the restric-
tions on virtually any form of political activity, including private citizens’s nor-
mal voting decisions, thereby restraining the use of nonpublic reason in relation 
  
32
 See, e.g., GREENAWALT, supra note 2, at 72-78 (describing but not endorsing a view that 
public reasons should be accessible from an impartial standpoint).  It is actually difficult to say 
whether this way of conceiving of the restraints imposed by public reason is narrower or broader 
than the exclusion of “religious” reasons, because―as Kent Greenawalt has observed―it is argu-
ably the case that at least some religious reasons are “accessible” and that at least some non-
religious reasons are inaccessible in the relevant sense.  See id. at 39-40. 
33
 See Rawls, Overlapping Consensus, supra note 10, at 8, 14; Solum, supra note 13, at 1468. 
34
 See Rawls, Overlapping Consensus, supra note 10, at 8; Solum, supra note 13, at 1468. 
35
 See EBERLE, supra note 2, at 12 (noting that, despite their disagreement on any number of 
issues, proponents of public reason are unanimous in identifying religious reasons as quintessen-
tially nonpublic). 
36
 See, e.g., Rawls, Public Reason, supra note 10, at 767-69; see also GREENAWALT, supra 
note 2, at 158-60. 
37
 See, e.g., Audi, supra note 31, at 278-89. 
38
 Rawls, Public Reason, supra note 10, at 770. 
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to virtually all political conduct apart from political discussions within private 
associations.39 
Finally, some theorists would require that, in situations in which the re-
straints of public reason apply, actors employ public reasons exclusively of 
nonpublic reasons.  This appears to have been the view of Rawls in his earlier 
thinking on the matter,40 although he ultimately changed his position.41  Alterna-
tively, following Lawrence Solum (and the later Rawls), one can conceive of the 
requirement of public reason as inclusive, requiring only that, at a minimum, 
speakers include public reasons among the reasons they offer.42    
The number of variables at play in discussions of public reason makes it 
possible for theorists to formulate an almost countless number of positions on 
the issue.  One can, like Audi, combine a narrow conception of the reasons ex-
cluded by the requirements of public reasonableness with a broad understanding 
of who must comply with those requirements, and under what circumstances.  
Alternatively, one can, like Rawls, adopt a broad conception of the reasons ex-
cluded and yet accept a narrower range of situations in which the exclusion will 
operate.  The possibilities are virtually endless.  And yet all of these positions 
rely on the same basic intuitions about legitimacy and stability and so are sus-
ceptible―admittedly to varying degrees―to the same broad set of critiques. 
C. Objections to Public Reason 
Most of the criticism of public reason has focused around three broad 
themes.  First, the sheer variety of theories, and the vagueness of some of the 
key terms on which they rely, have led some scholars to question the practicality 
or utility of the entire exercise.  John Finnis and others, for example, have criti-
cized Rawls’s account of public reason as riddled with “ambiguities so irresolu-
able as to amount to incoherence.”43  Michael Perry has likewise argued that 
trying to exclude religious argument from public debate would be an attempt to 
  
39
 See, e.g., Audi, supra note 31, at 278-89; GUTMANN & THOMPSON, supra note 2, at 52. 
40
 See RAWLS, supra note 2, at 247 n.36. 
41
 Rawls, Public Reason, supra note 10, at 776. 
42
 See Solum, supra note 13, at 1470.   
43
 John Finnis, On ‘Public Reason’ 3-4 (Notre Dame Legal Studies Paper No. 06-37, Apr. 
2006), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=955815.  Finnis focuses in particular on the difficulty 
of understanding what Rawls and other proponents of public reason mean when they talk about 
reasons that all reasonable citizens “may reasonably be expected to endorse.” Id. at 4.  As Finnis 
correctly observes, “expected” in this context can either be descriptive or normative.  If the stan-
dard is normative (What arguments ought reasonable people endorse?), then it presupposes some 
higher standard of truth or reasonableness by which to assess the publicity of an argument, and 
seems to render the overlapping consensus irrelevant.  But if it is merely predictive (What argu-
ments will reasonable people in fact endorse?), then it seems unacceptably arbitrary and contin-
gent.  See id.; see also Robert P. George & Christopher Wolfe, Natural Law and Public Reason, 
in NATURAL LAW AND PUBLIC REASON 51, 52-55 (Robert P. George & Christopher Wolfe eds., 
2000). 
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“do the impossible.”44  In a similarly pragmatic vein, Steve Shiffrin has ob-
served that, since the norms of public reason are understood by their proponents 
to operate at the level of political morality (as opposed to legal prohibition), and 
since the arguments on behalf of public reason are likely to be convincing pri-
marily to progressive religious believers, theories of public reasonableness 
would have the effect of working a unilateral disarmament and therefore an un-
desirable ideological distortion within the marketplace of ideas.45   
A second, and more conceptual, line of attack has been to question the 
claims of fairness made on behalf of public reason.  This criticism actually 
comes in two flavors.  First, scholars have argued that the notion of legitimacy 
underlying the call for the restraints of public reason is far too demanding.  
Against the view that the requirements of public reason are necessitated by a 
respect for the equal status of citizens, these critics argue that it would not im-
permissibly fail to treat people equally to adopt some less demanding standard, 
such as, for example, “a principle that the greater number would prevail in their 
judgments, even when their judgments include nonaccessible grounds.”46  Al-
ternatively, they say, we might conclude that fairness only requires that we al-
low “differing comprehensive views to compete in democratic politics.”47  In-
deed (they conclude), to assume, as do a number of proponents of restrictive 
public reason, that fairness requires that one not be coerced except on grounds 
that she could reasonably accept as her own is simply to assert at the outset that 
society must be structured according to liberal political principles, a claim that 
nonliberal theorists predictably reject.48 
This last point leads directly to the second flavor of fairness argument 
levied against public reason’s proponents:  that the requirement of public reason 
is not in fact neutral among conceptions of the good and therefore works its own 
form of unfairness.49  Audi’s account of public reason, to take the most egre-
  
44
 See PERRY, POLITICS, supra note 2, at 47; see also HOLLENBACH, supra note 7, at 170.  Perry 
makes a similarly pragmatic, but distinct, argument when he observes that the principles that 
satisfy the demands of some of the more demanding accounts of public reason may not be suffi-
ciently determinate to resolve the important debates in which they are deployed.  PERRY, POLITICS, 
supra note 2, at 57.  
45
 See Shiffrin, supra note 20, at 26  n.115.  
46
 GREENAWALT, supra note 2, at 77. 
47
 Steven Shiffrin, Religion and Democracy, 74 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1631, 1638 (1999).  See 
also EBERLE, supra note 2, at ch. 5; Michael J. Perry, Religious Morality and Public Choice, 30 
SAN DIEGO L. REV. 703, 714 (1993) (“Political choices that cannot be defended without relying on 
religious beliefs do not invariably deny to those who reject (or ‘reasonably’ reject) the beliefs the 
respect due them as fellow citizens, as ‘free and equal’ persons, or simply as human beings.”); 
PERRY, POLITICS, supra note 2, at 51, 59.  
48
 See Michael J. Sandel, Political Liberalism, 107 HARV. L. REV. 1765, 1777-82 (1994); see 
also PERRY, POLITICS, supra note 2, at 59; Larry Alexander, Liberalism, Religion, and the Unity of 
Epistemology, 30 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 763, 767 (1993). 
49
 See CARTER, supra note 6, at ch. 11; EBERLE, supra note 2, at 17, 140-48; Habermas, supra 
note 6, at 8-9; Smolin, supra note 6, at 1077-79. 
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gious example, would exclude virtually all (and only) religious arguments, the-
reby favoring secular conceptions of the good as well as those religious concep-
tions that view secular philosophy as an independent path to truth.50  But more 
even-handed accounts of public reason are also susceptible to this attack.  Res-
ponding to the fairly permissive account of public reason that Michael Perry set 
out in his book Love and Power, for example, David Smolin argued that Perry’s 
openness to public religious argumentation―so long as it values diversity and is 
open to revision―unfairly disfavors the political activity of evangelical Chris-
tians and other religious traditionalists.51   
The third theme voiced by critics of restrictive accounts of public reason 
has been to question the degree to which a permissive attitude toward the con-
tent of political argumentation would, in fact, destabilize our pluralist democra-
cy.  Scholars making these arguments have often pointed to the great distance 
between our society and the wars of religion in sixteenth century Europe.52  Da-
vid Hollenbach, for example, has challenged the notion that, within contempo-
rary society, discourse about religious views is necessarily uncivil or unproduc-
tive or will inevitably lead to conflict, as proponents of public reason often seem 
to assume.53  
I am sympathetic with all of these arguments, but I will explore in this 
essay a somewhat different facet of the stability question.  Instead of merely 
defending religious discourse against accusations that it is destabilizing, it is 
possible, as some theorists have already begun to do, to develop a radically dif-
ferent story about the relationship between pluralism and stability than the one 
on which Rawls, and many other proponents of restrictive public reason, impli-
citly rely.  It is to these two divergent stories of the relationship between diversi-
ty and stability that I turn in the next Part.  Once I have set them out, I will ex-
plain how applying within one story a theory of public reason that is more ap-
propriate than the other can help bring about the very instability that theories of 
public reason hope to avoid. 
III. TWO STORIES ABOUT DIVERSITY AND STABILITY 
Scholars usually tell one of two stories when they talk about the rela-
tionship between stability and the values of pluralism characteristic of modern 
  
50
 See Lawrence B. Solum, Pluralism and Public Legal Reason, 15 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 
7, 11 (2006).  
51
 See Smolin, supra note 6, at 1077-79.  In response to Smolin’s objections, Perry has mod-
ified his views and now favors a more inclusive position toward religious argument in political 
discourse.  See Michael J. Perry, Religious Morality and Public Choice, 30 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 
703, 713 (1993).  In a similar vein, Kent Greenawalt has observed that most accounts of public 
reason would permit secular speakers to employ their comprehensive conceptions of the good to a 
greater degree than would religious speakers.  See GREENAWALT, supra note 2, at 83. 
52
 See, e.g., PERRY, POLITICS, supra note 2, at 53 n.37 (collecting sources). 
53
 HOLLENBACH, supra note 7, at 160-65. 
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society.  The first story, and the dominant one within discussions of public rea-
son, is a “scary” story in which pluralism constitutes a grave threat to stability 
that must be tamed.  The second, and less common story, is one in which the 
relationship between pluralism and stability is portrayed far more optimistically, 
with pluralism affirmatively contributing to stability.   
A. The Scary Story 
The more familiar of the two stories about pluralism and diversity is the 
scary one.  This story actually consists of two subplots, one concerned with plu-
ralism’s impact on the quality of public deliberation and the second focused on 
its tendency to directly undermine social peace.  These two subplots are part of 
the same story because the deterioration of public discourse will likely push 
society toward acrimony and instability, but the mechanisms of the two are suf-
ficiently distinct that they are worth discussing separately. 
The first subplot, which attributes to pluralism a negative impact on the 
quality of public discourse, is implicitly linked, as Jeremy Waldron has noted, to 
an Aristotelian conception of deliberation, within which shared modes of rea-
soning are essential to deliberative success.54  Viewed from within this frame-
work, pluralism appears as an unalloyed threat to a society’s ability to deliberate 
because it undermines the necessary common ground on which to base a suc-
cessful public conversation.  Obviously, no particular comprehensive concep-
tion of the good can provide this common discursive bedrock, because, by as-
sumption, the fact of pluralism prevents any one conception from gaining suffi-
cient traction except through the (impermissible) use of coercion.55   
This is not to say that proponents of the scary story understand plural-
ism as bad or harmful in itself.  To the contrary, they attribute positive meaning 
to the observed diversity of beliefs about value within modern society, which 
they see as flowing from (and therefore indicative of) respect for freedom of 
conscience.56  At the same time, however, they tend to approach pluralism with 
some ambivalence because, while it is characteristic of a well ordered society, it 
also constitutes a looming threat to social harmony.57   
On this view, arguments tied too closely to a comprehensive conception 
of the good, and especially to religious conceptions, are dangerous to the quality 
of public deliberation because they have the tendency to give offense and to 
  
54
 See Jeremy Waldron, Religious Contributions in Public Deliberation, 30 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 
817, 835-36 (1993). 
55
 See Rawls, Overlapping Consensus, supra note 10, at 4. 
56
 See, e.g., RAWLS, supra note 2, at xxiv (“[P]luralism is not seen as disaster but rather as the 
natural outcome of the activities of human reason under enduring free institutions.”); Solum, 
supra note 13, at 1469. 
57
 See Wingenbach, supra note 10, at 224 (“For [Rawls], the lack of any common doctrine 
leads to political conflict and disorder, and, therefore, the need arises to impose a common but 
nometaphysical doctrine to ensure stability.”); Shiffrin, supra note 20, at 24. 
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inhibit discussion.  “The main reason religion needs to be privatized,” Richard 
Rorty argues, “is that, in political discussion with those outside the relevant reli-
gious community, it is a conversation-stopper.”58  By ending conversations pre-
maturely, religious argument degrades the quality of public deliberation. 
Drawing heavily on the sixteenth-century European wars of religion as 
a trope in order to illustrate the risks flowing from pluralism, the second sub-
plot of the scary story focuses on the role of pluralism as a more direct threat to 
civility in public life.59  The risk is always present that people committed to a 
particular conception of the good will seek to employ the coercive power of the 
state to advance their cause or will simply break out into open conflict with 
those committed to a different set of beliefs.  Unless this potential for conflict is 
constrained by some common moral commitment to coexist that is itself suffi-
ciently robust and entrenched, the argument goes, pluralist societies will labor 
under the constant threat that adherents of competing conceptions will turn on 
each other, causing society either to splinter into pieces or to descend into civil 
war.  Christopher L. Eberle helpfully dubs these warnings of civil war and social 
disintegration, respectively, the “argument from Bosnia” and the “argument 
from divisiveness.”60 
It is true that proponents of a particular conception of the good will of-
ten have difficulty amassing the power necessary to defeat their rivals.  Under 
these circumstances, they may abide by temporary cease-fire, living in relative 
peace, each hoping for a time when they can gain enough power to impose their 
own viewpoint.  But, Rawls asserts, this is merely a modus vivendi and is there-
fore inherently unstable, not a sound basis on which to build lasting social 
peace.61   
The project for those operating within both subplots of the scary story is 
to find some common set of beliefs around which enough people within a mod-
ern, pluralist society can come together.  Within Rawls’s thought, this unifying 
role is served by the “overlapping consensus,” which takes the form of a shared 
commitment to limited government that secures the (private) moral space within 
which different communities can peacefully deliberate and coexist.62  As I’ve 
already related, a crucial part of this overlapping consensus is a commitment to 
employ public reason when discussing important political questions.63  The 
commitment to public reason flows from a desire to avoid the socially disinte-
grative impact of deep moral, and especially religious, argument on public polit-
ical discourse.64  Theorists view these sorts of arguments as intrinsically uncivil 
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 RICHARD RORTY, PHILOSOPHY AND SOCIAL HOPE 171 (1999). 
59
 See EBERLE, supra note 2, at 154-55 (collecting sources). 
60
 Id. at ch. 6. 
61
 RAWLS, supra note 2, at 140. 
62
 See Rawls, Public Reason, supra note 10, at 773-74. 
63
 See supra notes 24-30 and accompanying text. 
64
 See supra note 57.  
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and prone to devolve into outright hostility or violence.  Society mitigates that 
risk by restricting them to the private sphere.  By bypassing comprehensive doc-
trines, Rawls explains, “we try to bypass religion and philosophy’s profoundest 
controversies so as to have some hope of uncovering a basis of a stable overlap-
ping consensus.”65   
B. The Happy Story 
Far less visible within the debate over public reason, but no less venera-
ble within political theory as a whole, is a more optimistic story about the rela-
tionship between pluralism and stability.  This alternative narrative treats plural-
ism as affirmatively fostering, rather than inevitably undermining, deliberation 
and stability.  Far from constituting a threat to be cabined, pluralism―on this 
view―contributes positively to the quality of public deliberation and, somewhat 
paradoxically, becomes part of the glue that holds society together. 
The prelude to the happy story is to cast doubt on the claim that deep 
moral and religious argument within our pluralist society is especially likely to 
lead to instability and violence.  As a general matter, Joseph Raz has correctly 
observed that it is not clear that social stability depends on shared modes of 
moral reasoning and deliberation as much as on the effectiveness of less rational 
symbolic and cultural commitments that bind national communities together.66  
And, as numerous commentators have observed, religious argumentation is 
widespread in our public discourse, as it has been throughout our history, and 
yet there are no signs of an impending descent into religious warfare.67 
Like the scary story, the happy story can be disaggregated into two sub-
plots.  In the first, theorists discuss the effect of pluralism on the quality of the 
outcomes produced by public deliberation.  In the second, they focus on the 
directly salutary effect of pluralism on political stability. 
  
65
 Rawls, Overlapping Consensus, supra note 10, at 14.  It is for a similar reason that, in dis-
cussing his version of public reason, Solum expresses his concern that his willingness to permit 
religious and other nonpublic reasons into the public debate (so long as they are accompanied by 
adequately public reasons) will undermine social stability.  “Even if the…nonpublic reasons are 
limited to a supporting role for public reasons,” he says, “allowing them at all risks undermining 
the value of civility.  After all, the fact that a religious reason is given at all may be offensive to 
some.”  Solum, supra note 14, at 749.  Although Solum ultimately views the benefits of permit-
ting nonpublic reasons to outweigh the costs of excluding them, his concern about their possibly 
corrosive impact on civility bears the fingerprints of the scary story.  See id. at 748-52.  Of course, 
that he engages in balancing at all means that Solum understands that the restriction of religious 
reasons entails certain deliberative costs.  In other words, his argument implicitly relies on intui-
tions very similar to those underlying my argument in Part IV.  In the final analysis, however, 
Solum does not fully acknowledge the possible questions those costs raise for the particular theory 
of public reason he favors. 
66
 Raz, supra note 16, at 30-31 (“Symbolic and affective identification and a partial cognitive 
overlap may be a very firm foundation for social unity and stability . . . .”). 
67
 See Shiffrin, supra note 20, at 24-25; Phillip L. Quinn, Political Liberalisms and Their 
Exclusions of the Religious, 69 PROC. & ADDRESSES OF THE AM. PHIL. ASS’N 35, 39 (1995). 
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Waldron points toward the first part of this happy story in his discussion 
of Mill’s conception of the marketplace of ideas.68  He is correct that John Stuart 
Mill’s vision of deliberation attributes affirmative value to pluralism in a way 
that puts it fundamentally at odds with the scary story.  For Mill: 
Truth, in the great practical concerns of life, is so much a ques-
tion of the reconciling and combining of opposites, that very 
few have minds sufficiently capacious and impartial to make 
the adjustment with an approach to correctness, and it has to be 
made by the rough process of a struggle between combatants 
fighting under hostile banners.69   
As Waldron observes, “[f]or Mill's model to work, it is less important 
that the competing ideas be intellectually commensurable,” and so the question 
of regulating the content of public discussions for consistency with an ideal of 
public reasonableness never really arises.70  
Waldron describes this Millian conception of public discourse as one in 
which competing factions alternatively fling their ideas at one another.  He asks: 
Who cares if a specifically biblical doctrine is flung up against 
the secular views of, say, a Robert Nozick or a P.J. O'Rourke?  
The ideas will have their effect on one another, and something 
better will (or may) emerge in the clash, even though the “ad-
justment” between the two views has not been made by any 
“single mind.”71   
I agree with Waldron that, so described, Mill’s model is not an especially attrac-
tive one.72 
But, instead of celebrating the directionless clash of factions or the 
mindless flinging of ideas, we can emphasize, with Cass R. Sunstein and Scott 
Page, among others, the value of including a diversity of viewpoints and 
ideas―even seemingly incommensurable ones―within the deliberative 
process.73  The principal danger to be avoided on this view is not excessive plu-
ralism but rather too constrained a debate, and in particular a debate from which 
specific points of view are systematically excluded.74  Dissenters and out-groups 
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 See Waldron, supra note 54, at 836-37. 
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 JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 47 (Alburey Castell ed., Harlan Davidson, Inc. 1947). 
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 Waldron, supra note 54, at 837. 
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 Id. 
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 See id. 
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 See generally Cass R. Sunstein, The Law of Group Polarization, 10 J. POL. PHIL. 175 
(2002); PAGE, supra note 9, at 285-86; Waldron, supra note 54, at 841-42. 
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 See Sunstein, supra note 73, at 184-85. 
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who introduce their ideas into public discourse play a crucial role in restraining 
established groupthink, prompting discussion where consensus might otherwise 
be unreflectively assumed.75  Within this subplot of the happy story, the aim of 
deliberation should not be to set artificial limits on the content that will be ad-
mitted into the public conversation but instead to cast the net widely, bringing in 
as many viewpoints as practicable in order to correct for the deliberative blind-
spots that inevitably result when we speak only with the like-minded.    
The second subplot of the happy story focuses on the way in which plu-
ralism directly contributes to political stability.  It is perhaps most famously 
embodied in James Madison’s argument in The Federalist No. 10 about the rela-
tionship between the stability of republican government and the size and diversi-
ty of the political community.76  Far from conceiving of pluralism as a threat to 
be feared, Madison viewed it as an essential ingredient of stability in a free so-
ciety.  Like proponents of the scary story, Madison begins with the fact of plu-
ralism.77  The solution he offers, however, is not a unifying overlapping consen-
sus or the pacifying constraints of public reason.  Instead, he describes the solu-
tion to the fact of pluralism as yet more pluralism, which will make it increa-
singly difficult for one faction to exert unfettered control over state power: 
The smaller the society, the fewer probably will be the distinct 
parties and interests composing it; the fewer the distinct parties 
and interests, the more frequently will a majority be found of 
the same party; and the smaller the number of individuals com-
posing a majority, and the smaller the compass within which 
they are placed, the more easily will they concert and execute 
their plans of oppression. Extend the sphere, and you take in a 
greater variety of parties and interests; you make it less proba-
ble that a majority of the whole will have a common motive to 
  
75
 Alexander Hamilton discusses the positive role for the seemingly impolite flinging of ideas 
within legislative debate, which he sees as promoting “deliberation and circumspection” and 
“check[ing] the excesses of the majority.”  THE FEDERALIST NO. 70 (Alexander Hamilton). 
76
 THE FEDERALIST NO. 10 (James Madison). 
77
 Id.  As Madison put it: 
A zeal for different opinions concerning religion, concerning Government and 
many other points, as well of speculation as of practice; an attachment to dif-
ferent leaders ambitiously contending for pre-eminence and power; or to per-
sons of other descriptions whose fortunes have been interesting to the human 
passions, have, in turn divided mankind into parties, inflamed them with mu-
tual animosity, and rendered them much more disposed to vex and oppress 
each other than to co-operate for their common good. So strong is this propen-
sity of mankind to fall into mutual animosities, that where no substantial occa-
sion presents itself, the most frivolous and fanciful distinctions have been suf-
ficient to kindle their unfriendly passions, and excite their most violent con-
flicts. 
Id. 
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invade the rights of other citizens; or if such a common motive 
exists, it will be more difficult for all who feel it to discover 
their own strength, and to act in unison with each other.78  
A number of modern political theorists have followed Madison in af-
firming that pluralism contributes positively to stability, although they have 
attributed that positive relationship to a somewhat different mechanism.  Madi-
son’s discussion in The Federalist No. 10, which focuses on the difficulty of one 
particular faction gaining sufficient political power to impose its program on the 
rest of society, takes for granted that each faction will invariably be prone to 
seek such a totalizing victory.  He simply argues that a sufficiently pluralist so-
ciety will make such victory virtually impossible to achieve.79   
Modern theorists, however, tend to take a more dynamic approach to the 
behavior of factions and to argue that being forced to operate within the context 
of a pluralist political society affirmatively moderates the aspirations of “fac-
tions.”  We can understand this moderating impact as working through at least 
two different, though by no means mutually exclusive, mechanisms.  First, when 
members of different groups interact in a pluralist political community, they 
may exert social pressure on each other to moderate their demands.  As Nicho-
las R. Miller has described it, “many interactions [in a pluralist society] must 
take place across preference clusters and, insofar as preferences are shaped by 
social pressures, these pressures are operating in somewhat contrary directions, 
producing less intense and probably less extreme attitudes.”80   
Second, the process of coalition formation necessary to cobble together 
a working majority within a pluralist society creates its own incentives for 
groups to restrain themselves from acting in ways that will permanently alienate 
their current adversaries.  In a diverse society, “[t]hose who are enemies in one 
situation are sometimes required to act as allies in another situation.  With an 
eye on future co-operation, they restrain their behavior in present competi-
tion.”81   
In other words, the coalition building predicted by Madison in The Fe-
deralist No. 10 not only makes it harder for factions to gain power, it may ac-
tually foster the very virtues of moderation and pragmatism that reduce the 
threat posed by faction and thereby help to stabilize a diverse society.82  These 
stabilizing mechanisms do not operate as well when society is divided along just 
a small number of lines into a handful of groups that do not overlap or need to 
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 Nicholas R. Miller, Pluralism and Social Choice, 77 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 734, 736 (1983). 
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 See THE FEDERALIST NO. 10 (James Madison). 
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rely much on each other to exercise political power.  Consequently, it may be 
the case that a less diverse society is at greater risk of instability than one in 
which radical diversity―and the cooperative political activity it encourages―is 
a more or less permanent fact of life.  As Edward Alsworth Ross put it: 
A society . . . which is riven by a dozen oppositions along lines 
running in every direction, may actually be in less danger of be-
ing torn with violence or falling to pieces than one split along 
just one line.  For each new cleavage contributes to narrow the 
cross clefts, so that one might say that society is sewn together 
by its inner conflicts.83  
IV. HOW PUBLIC REASON MIGHT FOSTER THE SCARY STORY 
Whether, at the end of the day, the fact of pluralism undermines society 
or stabilizes it, whether it actually degrades public discourse or (on balance) 
improves it, ought to be of central importance to the debate over public reason.  
This is especially the case in light of theorists’ professed interest in fostering 
stability.  And yet the discussion to date has occurred without reference to these 
empirical questions.84  Which of the two competing stories is more salient, how-
ever, should make a great deal of difference to the ways in which theorists treat 
the question of pluralism, including religious pluralism, and its role within pub-
lic discourse because applying a conception of public reason that would be ap-
propriate within the scary story may actually prove detrimental to that goal if 
society actually operates more along the lines described within the happy story.  
If, on balance, pluralism works to affirmatively improve the quality of public 
discourse and to stabilize society, adopting a conception of public reason that 
seeks to stifle the full expression of society’s pluralism could prove detrimental.  
It could have the effect of squandering the deliberative benefits of existing di-
versity in order to buy insurance against a non-existent risk, thereby creating a 
self-fulfilling prophecy in which the purported cure helps to bring about the 
very discursive and communal harms that it seeks to forestall. 
This is a different point than Shiffrin’s makes, which I have already dis-
cussed above, about public reason leading to unilateral disarmament,85  al-
though, the two points are not wholly unrelated, as I will discuss.  Shiffrin con-
vincingly argues that, as a practical matter, only religious progressives are likely 
to find the arguments in favor of public reason sufficiently convincing that they 
actually restrain their use of religious argument in public discourse.  As a con-
sequence, he observes, voluntary movement toward the norm of public reason 
will inevitably be politically unbalanced, leaving the field of public religious 
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 See, e.g., EBERLE, supra note 2, at 160; PAUL J. WEITHMAN, RELIGION AND THE OBLIGATIONS 
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argument to political conservatives.86  I would go one step further, however, and 
assert that, even if the requirements of public reason were honored equally by 
religious people of all political stripes, it might ultimately foster more extrem-
ism and instability than it successfully avoids. 
A. Public Reason’s Narrowing of the Public Conversation 
How might this work?  Theories of public reason operate by excluding 
categories of speech as well as, to a less but still very real degree, ideas and 
speakers from public debate.  This is easiest to see with exclusive versions of 
public reason, which prohibit certain sorts of argument in relation to at least 
some categories of public discourse (typically public discourse aimed at the 
most fundamental and important issues a society confronts).  Speakers who are 
unable adequately to translate their ideas into terms that satisfy the requirements 
of a particular, exclusive conception of public reason, and ideas whose transla-
tion into the language of public reason deprives them of some essential content, 
will therefore be wholly excluded from (or disabled within) the relevant public 
discussions.  This inability to translate will most often, but not exclusively, be 
associated with particular religious traditions.87 
Even for those who can “translate,” however, exclusive conceptions of 
public reason can work to silence the central, and perhaps most compelling, 
elements of religious speakers’ political beliefs and motives.  An example fre-
quently raised by critics of public reason, but no less compelling for the wear, is 
Martin Luther King’s “I Have a Dream” speech. 88   The famous oration has 
been described by one commentator as “a significant example of theo-political 
rhetoric distinguished by substantive elements of the concept of proclamation in 
the Judeo-Christian tradition . . . .”89   
As Drew D. Hansen has recently observed, the prepared text of the 
speech “stayed close to standard themes from the political rhetoric of the 1960s 
and the oratory of the civil rights movement: the appeal to American ideals, the 
protest against gradualism, the call for nonviolence and racial integration within 
the freedom movement.”90  Had King not extemporized to include the soaring 
prophetic imagery of the speech’s conclusion, some of it drawn straight out of 
the Bible, “it is doubtful,” Hansen argues, “that his speech at the end of the 
march would be remembered at all.”91  Robert N. Bellah and his co-authors con-
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Orality, in MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR., AND THE SERMONIC POWER OF PUBLIC DISCOURSE 104, 104 
(Carolyn Calloway-Thomas & John Louis Lucaites eds., 1993). 
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 DREW D. HANSEN, THE DREAM 135 (2003). 
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cur in identifying the great power of the speech in King’s amalgamation of “the 
poetry of the scriptural prophets . . . with the lyrics of patriotic anthems . . . .”92  
As John Patton observes, “[the] famous section of the speech where the dream 
becomes most specific is wrapped at the beginning in a secular abstraction . . . 
and culminates in a universal theological abstraction.”93  And yet the powerful, 
religiously infused political imagery of those concluding minutes―much of it 
spontaneously inserted by King as he spoke―is precisely the element of the 
speech that would most clearly fail to qualify under exclusive theories of public 
reasonableness.94    
Perhaps less intuitively, a process of exclusion operates―albeit to a 
more limited extent―even within so-called “inclusive” theories of public rea-
son.  Inclusive theories, like Solum’s (and like Rawls’s later versions of his 
theory) permit the assertion of nonpublic reasons provided that they are accom-
panied in due course by public reasons.  But, as with exclusive theories of pub-
lic reason, even inclusive theories exclude those who cannot (or, for reasons 
having to do with the content of their religious conception, will not) provide a 
reason that satisfies the requirements of publicity.   
Karl Barth’s evangelical moral theology, for example, conceives of hu-
man beings’ knowledge of the good as rooted in their perception of a “command 
of God.”95  Barth understood this command as “immediate and direct guidance” 
about what to do that is apprehended within the context of a “personal encoun-
ter” between human being and God that is “immediate, direct, and intimate in 
form.”96  This apprehension of divine command is not mediated by moral theory 
and is therefore difficult, if not impossible, to translate into the language of pub-
lic reason.97  As Robin Lovin describes Barth’s ethics, “[t]he child of God 
knows in action what God’s will requires, but this certainty is neither visible to 
his neighbor nor available for his own reflection.”98  A believer committed to 
Barth’s conception of ethics would not be able to offer any publicly cognizable 
reason for her behavior, even in the form of a mediating moral principle.  She 
  
92
 ROBERT N. BELLAH ET AL., HABITS OF THE HEART 249 (2d ed. 1996); see also PERRY, 
POLITICS, supra note 2, at 48-49. 
93
 Patton, supra note 89, at 114. 
94
 Rawls attempted to make some allowance in his theory of public reason for the use of reli-
gious language by proponents of abolition and civil rights.  See RAWLS, supra note 2, at 249-50.  
The inadequacy of his explanation of the propriety of that language has been amply criticized 
elsewhere.  See Sandel, supra note 48, at 1791; Shiffrin, supra note 20, at 31-32. 
95
 NIGEL BIGGAR, THE HASTENING THAT WAITS 14 (1993). 
96
 Id. at 15. 
97
 See id. at 17-18 (“This concept of the divine command allows room for only one legitimate 
kind of ethical reflection; not that which engages in theoretical enquiry into the nature of the good, 
but that which takes the form of self-examination.  Through this form of reflection I ask myself ‘at 
every moment of [my] willing and acting’ whether my life has been and will be directed toward 
the telos of real humanity to which I have been elected in Jesus Christ . . . .”) (quoting 2 KARL 
BARTH, CHURCH DOGMATICS 566-67, 634-36, 641-42, 645-61 (1936)). 
98
 ROBIN LOVIN, CHRISTIAN FAITH AND PUBLIC CHOICES  41 (1984). 
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would, in fact, view any such effort to explain her behavior without reference to 
divine command as improper.  The Barthian believer would therefore be utterly 
excluded from public deliberation, even by inclusive accounts of public reason. 
Inclusive theories of public reason also have a negative, though less 
dramatic, effect on those who are able to translate.  To begin with, the need to 
translate certain sorts of arguments, but not others, into public terms casts an 
epistemological stigma over the non-public discourse.  As Stephen L. Carter 
puts it, by “require[ing] the individual whose religious tradition makes demands 
on his or her moral conscience to reformulate that conscience . . . in order to 
gain the right to participate in the dialogue alongside other citizens,” the “liberal 
world” indicates that it “regards religious knowledge of being of a decidedly 
inferior sort.”99  Carter’s observation applies whether the conception of public 
reason requiring the reformulation is exclusive or inclusive.  This stigma itself 
may discourage some religious believers―even those who can translate―from 
raising their religious arguments in public or from participating in public politi-
cal debate at all. 
Moreover, while inclusive theories would not categorically exclude reli-
gious content, they would still force religious speakers to accompany their most 
powerful arguments with language translating those arguments into the vocabu-
lary of public reason, a process that will often result in the (forced) presentation 
of arguments that are less authentic and, as a consequence, less compelling.  The 
assertion of the less persuasive public arguments―the price of admission into 
public discourse for an inclusive system of public reason―could undermine the 
credibility of the nonpublic arguments, which might themselves seem less force-
ful when juxtaposed with their more unconvincing translations.   
Both exclusive and inclusive accounts of public reason, then, are likely 
to drive at least some religious speakers from the public square and to weaken 
the effectiveness of others.100  Moreover, inclusive versions of public reason 
place special discursive burdens on religious speakers who seek to participate in 
public discourse, burdens that are not shared by those predisposed to employ 
secular (or otherwise public) arguments.  The result of broad compliance with 
theories of public reason―of either variety―will predictably be that a number 
of religious speakers who otherwise might have participated in public discourse 
will be excluded or will voluntarily disengage.  In the United States, where a 
large portion of the population identifies itself as religious, the scope of this 
exclusion would likely be nontrivial.101   
  
99
 CARTER, supra note 6, at 229. 
100
 This is less true of Habermas’s theory of public reason, which applies only at the level of 
the institutional state, and would therefore permit the free participation of religious voices in the 
public debate, so long as religious arguments are translated into secular terms by someone before 
the institutional state itself adopts them as its own.  See Habermas, supra note 6, at 8-11. 
101
 See EBERLE, supra note 2, at 184; Habermas, supra note 6, at 2; Shiffrin, supra note 20, at 
30 (“Ninety percent of Americans believe in God.”).  I agree with Shiffrin, however, that there is 
little danger of widespread compliance with restrictive versions of public reason, especially on the 
part of religious conservatives. 
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B. The Deliberative Consequences of Public Reason’s Exclusions 
The exclusion worked by public reason―whether self-inflicted or im-
posed by others―might generate a number of negative consequences for the 
quality of public (and private) deliberation and for social stability.  I will focus 
on two: the way in which the silencing of religious voices in the public sphere 
might operate to inhibit the initiation of public deliberation and, second, the way 
in which the exclusion worked by public reason might distort the content and 
outcome of that deliberation once it begins. 
1. Deliberative Inhibition 
Proponents of public reason focus their attention on the ideal rules of 
behavior within conversations between people committed to different compre-
hensive conceptions of the good.  But by emphasizing the rules of debate once 
discussion is underway, these theorists ignore the difficulty of getting public 
conversations started in the first place.  In setting onerous preconditions for par-
ticipation in public deliberation among people who think radically differently 
from each other, however, proponents of public reason may be fixating on the 
far less salient barrier to ecumenical dialogue.102   
People are generally predisposed to seek out conversation primarily 
with those who already think like them.103  This is at least in part because con-
versing, particularly with those with whom we disagree, is hard work.  Most 
people would rather go about their business working, playing, and otherwise 
living their lives.  Conversation starting is therefore something of a public good 
that is, like many public goods, prone to underproduction in the absence of ap-
propriate incentives or social norms.  Moreover, because beneficiaries of the 
status quo often have very little interest in talking about change, conversation 
starting is particularly challenging when the subject under discussion is an injus-
tice from which the majority (or an established oligarchy) profits at the expense 
of a minority (or powerless majority).  
In this country, religious thought has consistently played an important 
role in generating the emotion and commitment necessary to push people 
beyond themselves so as to motivate them to initiate and participate in crucial 
public discussions.  Numerous commentators from Alexis de Tocqueville to the 
present-day have agreed that one of the crucial functions that religious commun-
ities have served has been to counteract “the ever present tendency of citizens in 
an economically prosperous democracy to privatize their lives by immersing 
  
102
 I borrow the term “ecumenical” to refer to inter-tradition dialogue from Michael Perry’s 
Love and Power, ch. 6 (1991).  
103
 See CASS SUNSTEIN, REPUBLIC.COM 56-60 (2001) (“[T]here is a natural human tendency to 
make choices, with respect to entertainment and news, that do not disturb our preexisting view of 
the world.”). 
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themselves exclusively in commercial pursuits.”104  “There is no religion,” de 
Tocqueville observed, “which does not . . . impose on man some duties toward 
his kind, and thus draw him at times from the contemplation of himself.”105  As 
Robert Bellah and his co-authors note, this tendency of religion to push people 
outside themselves has propelled religious communities toward the center of 
virtually every important social movement in American history.  “[W]ithout the 
intervention of the churches,” Bellah argues, “many significant issues would 
have been ignored and needed changes would have come about much more 
slowly.”106  Far from being an inherent conversation stopper, religious discourse 
has started some of the most important conversations in our nation’s history.107   
This observation is not susceptible to Eberle’s objection that arguments 
defending religious discourse in public life on the basis of religious groups’ past 
involvement in social movements necessarily rest on an unjustifiably rosy con-
ception of religion’s net moral impact.  On Eberle’s view, pointing out that reli-
gious communities have been at the heart of important social movements is only 
an effective counter to restrictive accounts of public reason if, on balance, reli-
gious interventions have occurred on the right moral side of the moral de-
bates.108  Eberle is surely correct that “[t]here is . . . no uncontroversial way to 
determine where on the continuum that ranges between angelic good and de-
monic evil we ought to place a given crusade.”109   
Contrary to Eberle, however, the observation that religious communities 
have played a crucial conversation-starting role―or that the reduction of public 
conversations that would result from religious privatization would constitute a 
social harm―does not depend on the premise that religious groups, on balance, 
tend to stake out the morally correct position within those conversations.  The 
argument is not that religious communities are, over the run of cases, more like-
ly than other groups to be on the right side of issues.  After all, as Bellah notes, 
religious groups have been on both sides of virtually every important social 
  
104
 CHRISTOPHER F. MOONEY, PUBLIC VIRTUE X (1986) (quoted in HOLLENBACH, supra note 7, 
at 93); see also BELLAH ET AL., supra note 92, at 223. 
105
 ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 152 (Richard D. Heffner ed., 1984). 
106
 BELLAH ET AL., supra note 92, at 249; see also WEITHMAN, supra note 84, at ch. 2 (discuss-
ing the role of religion in promoting democracy). 
107
 Relatedly, theorists of public reason may unduly privilege a rationalist account of public 
deliberation.  As the Civil Rights movement amply demonstrates, passion, and not reason, may be 
precisely what the doctor orders to get entrenched injustice on the public’s deliberative table.   See 
Shiffrin, supra note 47, at 1634.  Public reason’s elevation of measured rationality as the sine qua 
non of fruitful public discourse seems to rest on an artificially narrow understanding of how pub-
lic discussion operates.  If many of the most passionate voices have been silenced, controversial 
but necessary deliberation may have a great deal of difficulty even getting off the ground.  By 
encouraging the withdrawal, at least in part, of religious speakers from public deliberation, propo-
nents of public reason may unwittingly work to protect existing injustice against public debate in a 
way that allows it to fester and perhaps sows the seeds for future instability. 
108
 See EBERLE, supra note 2, at 176. 
109
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movement in American history.110  The argument I am making is instead a 
second-order argument that public engagement is an affirmative good.  It is, 
however, a good that is perennially likely to be in short supply, and the shortage 
of that engagement is, at least within a democracy, a cause for concern.111  Reli-
gious commitment helps to generate public engagement.  Even when religious 
groups (rightly) end up on the losing side of a debate they helped to instigate, 
society benefits from the debate having occurred. 
2. Deliberative Distortion 
Not only might adherence to the requirements of public reason inhibit 
the initiation of public deliberation, but, by systematically depriving public dis-
course of certain types of religious perspectives, public reason might impoverish 
that deliberation once it begins.  When homogeneous groups deliberate, their 
members have a tendency to settle on conclusions that are more extreme―and 
less reliable112―than those they espoused as individuals prior to the delibera-
tion.113  This is because speakers within a homogenous group feel social pres-
sure to conform to the views being expressed by members of the group and be-
cause homogeneity restricts the “argument pool” to which group members are 
exposed.114   
The exclusion of certain religious points of view from public discourse 
may therefore diminish the quality of the deliberation both of those who partici-
pate in the public conversation as well as those who are excluded.  Applying 
Sunstein’s model, public discussions will yield less reliable results as the pool of 
discussants becomes narrower.  In this case, the exclusion of certain religious 
points of view could have the effect of pushing the public discussion in secular 
directions as the requirements of public reason―in both its exclusive and inclu-
sive forms―increase the profile of nonreligious arguments relative to religious 
ones and systematically exclude the religious voices of those who cannot trans-
late and push to the margins the religious arguments of those who can.  If people 
abide by the rules of public reason, public deliberation will make the world 
seem like a more secular place than it actually is, and the solutions on which 
participants settle within that public conversation will likely shift toward those 
favored by secular thought.  This shift will likely have substantive consequences 
because, as Habermas points out, “[r]eligious traditions have a special power to 
articulate moral intuitions, especially with regard to vulnerable forms of com-
munal life.”115   
  
110
 See BELLAH ET AL., supra note 92, at 248-49. 
111
 As Justice Louis D. Brandeis put it, “the greatest menace to freedom is an inert people.”  
Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring). 
112
 See PAGE, supra note 9, at 157-65. 
113
 See SUNSTEIN, supra note 103, at 65-69, 72; Sunstein, supra note 73, at 176. 
114
 Sunstein, supra note 73, at 176-77. 
115
 Habermas, supra note 6, at 10. 
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Nor would the distortion worked by the exclusion of religious voices be 
neutral with respect to race and class.  As Paul J. Weithman and David Hollen-
bach have observed, the distortion generated by the exclusion of religious voices 
from the public square would likely exacerbate racial and economic inequality 
in political influence in the United States.116  Drawing on the research of Sidney 
Verba and other social scientists, Weithman notes that the exclusion of religious 
voices would disproportionately silence African-Americans and the poor, both 
of whom benefit enormously from churches’ egalitarian inculcation of civic 
engagement and skills.117  “The weight of the counterbalance black churches 
provide to offset other sources of African-American political inequality,” 
Weithman pointedly observes, “presses the question of what other institution 
would play this function if churches ceased to play a prominent political 
role.”118 
At the same time, restrictive accounts of public reason would distort the 
deliberation of those who withdraw or are discouraged from participating in the 
public conversation.  After all, those groups are likely to (re)turn toward conver-
sation with those who think more like them, with the result that they will be less 
likely to find their own presuppositions challenged by divergent voices.  More-
over, the perception among the disfavored groups that they have been wronged 
by the rules of public debate will likely exacerbate the distorting effects of ex-
clusion.119  The excluded, nonpublic groups will therefore predictably find their 
own private conversations tending to diverge from the broader public’s.  Within 
such enclaves, isolated from the moderating effects of public engagement, the 
risk of extremism will increase.120  Or, as Michael Sandel has put it, 
“[f]undamentalists rush in where liberals fear to tread.”121 
We can get a taste of the distorting effects that restrictive accounts of 
public reason may have on political deliberation by considering the relative 
quiescence of the religious left over the past few decades.  (This is where my 
argument converges with Shiffrin’s.)  Although progressive religious voices 
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 See HOLLENBACH, supra note 7, at 180-81; WEITHMAN, supra note 84, at 40-48; see also 
SIDNEY VERBA ET AL., VOICE AND EQUALITY 320 (1995). 
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 See WEITHMAN, supra note 84, at 45-48. 
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 Id. at 48. 
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 See EBERLE, supra note 2, at 184. 
120
 See Sunstein, supra note 73, at 191 (“It is total or near-total self-insulation, rather than 
group deliberation as such, that carries with it the most serious dangers, often in the highly unfor-
tunate (and sometimes deadly) combination of extremism with marginality.”); see also Solum, 
supra note 14, at 748-49.  This is not to deny the value of the diversity of communal voices that 
arise when groups retreat into isolated deliberation away from the moderating effects of the 
broader society, a phenomenon that Sunstein helpfully dubs “enclave deliberation.”  Sunstein, 
supra note 73, at 177.  Arguably, to be healthy, a system of deliberation requires a balance of both 
(1) protected private enclaves to which communities of discourse can retreat to formulate and 
refine their diverse conceptions of the good, even radical conceptions, and (2) public spaces that 
provide disparate groups with the opportunity to come together to interact and debate.  
121
 Sandel, supra note 48, at 1794.   
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were extremely prominent during the Civil Rights Movement,122 in recent years 
they have been far less audible, perhaps in part in response to the growing con-
sensus among the liberal intelligentsia that religious discourse does not belong 
in the political sphere.123  The relative silence of this distinctive voice within the 
American political conversation has perhaps contributed to what commentators 
have perceived as a rising hostility to religion within the American left.124  That 
is, with the decline of forceful religious voices in liberal circles, due at least in 
part to the self-restraint advocated by proponents of public reason, the left has 
arguably drifted in a decidedly secular direction, just as Sunstein’s model pre-
dicts.  This distortion of progressive political discourse is mirrored by a corres-
ponding tendency to identify conservatism with religiosity, resulting in a con-
temporary political culture characterized by a sharp polarization between an 
increasingly secular left and a “religious right.”125   
Once this polarization takes root, it can become perniciously self-
reinforcing.  Conservative voices come to be seen as authentically “religious” in 
a way that progressive religious voices are not, precisely because we are more 
accustomed to hearing them.  Eventually, even when religious progressives 
speak, they are ignored or written off as anomalous by those who control the 
means of communication.  It is not altogether surprising then, that, as one recent 
study has found, religious voices in the mainstream media disproportionately 
represent conservative political points of view.126 
Several scholars have correctly argued that the solution to this distortion 
is not public reason’s proposal to restrict religious political expression from the 
right―which is, if anything, a utopian fantasy―but rather the reinvigoration of 
progressive religious voices.127  In Philip L. Quinn’s words, only religious pro-
gressives can “argue for liberal laws and policies from religious premises and 
thereby show secular liberals that some religious people are their allies, and they 
would also be in a position to dispute the political agenda of the Religious Right 
on religious grounds.”128  In so doing, religious progressives could challenge the 
current self-understanding of American politics as a contest between a secular 
left and a religious right.  When scholars like Quinn argue along these lines, 
they are implicitly drawing on the happy story and the affiliated model of public 
deliberation I am describing.  
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 See CARTER, supra note 6, at 227-29. 
123
 See Jim Wallis, Let’s Clear the Air, Beliefnet, http://www.beliefnet.com/blogs/godpolitics/ 
2007/02/jim-wallis-lets-clear-air.html (last visited Feb. 23, 2007). 
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 See id.; see also Shiffrin, supra note 20, at 1 (“In recent years the dominant media picture of 
the relationship between religion and the left has been one of hostility, estrangement, and suspi-
cion.”). 
125
 Quinn, supra note 67, at 50. 
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 See Media Matters for America, Left Behind (unpublished manuscript), available at 
http://mediamatters.org/leftbehind/). 
127
 Id.; see also Shiffrin, supra note 20, at 26. 
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 Quinn, supra note 67, at 50. 
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None of this is to deny that homogeneity can have its benefits.  Scott 
Page has argued, for example, that deliberative outcomes improve when people 
bring a variety of intellectual tools (what he calls “toolbox diversity”) to the task 
of solving problems that stand in the way of accomplishing certain goals.129  But 
he is careful to observe that diversity of preferences and values (“preference 
diversity”) can generate conflict over what count as the right goals to begin 
with.130  Of course, as he also points out, the existence of preference diversity is 
not itself unrelated to the existence of toolbox diversity, as the pursuit of differ-
ent preferred goals is likely to lead people to develop different sets of intellec-
tual tools.131  In other words, diversity is a complex phenomenon that generates 
both costs and benefits, often at the same time.  Whether the benefits of deep 
normative diversity outweigh its costs is a difficult question that may not lend 
itself to a single answer for all times and places.132   
This country’s experience of economic prosperity and (relative) reli-
gious peace, even as religious diversity exploded over the course of the twen-
tieth century, and despite the utter absence of the ethic of self-restraint de-
manded by theories of public reason, provides at least some reason to think that, 
for our particular society, the beneficial effects of pluralism outweigh its costs.  
At the same time, it calls into question assertions that the restraints of public 
reason are necessary to hold our democracy together.133  Nor is it clear that the 
sort of hyper diversity that appeared in the United States over the course of the 
last century is a particularly virulent version of pluralism that calls for radical 
measures.  Indeed, it may be the case that the threat posed by diversity to stabili-
ty is far more grave when the degree of pluralism is mild and the cleavages are 
few in number.  It is worth more than a passing notice that the societies that 
engaged in the sixteenth century religious bloodletting were, if anything, far 
more religiously homogeneous than our own and that our most diverse com-
munities―our cities―are also by and large our most tolerant.134  
Moreover, as it turns out, our own Constitution’s treatment of religious 
pluralism seems an ideal match with a society operating according to the happy 
story.  By simultaneously prohibiting the establishment of religion and protect-
ing the right to exercise one’s religion, the First Amendment dramatically low-
ers the stakes of permitting religious participation in public discourse.135  Al-
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 See PAGE, supra note 9, at 11. 
130
 See id. 
131
 See id. at 286 (“When we say that people have diverse preferences, we will mean that we 
have different goals, desires, wants, and needs.  And we acquire diverse cognitive tools to satisfy 
these preferences . . . .  Preference diversity begets toolbox diversity.  And therefore, preference 
diversity has a strong and positive effect on problem solving.”). 
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 See id. at 331-34; GREENAWALT, supra note 2, at 6. 
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 See PERRY, POLITICS, supra note 2, at 53 n.37 (quoting Lawrence B. Solum, Faith and Jus-
tice, 39 DEPAUL L. REV. 1083, 1096 (1990)). 
134
 See ROSS, supra note 83, at 164-65; Miller, supra note 80, at 735. 
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 See EBERLE, supra note 2, at 161-62; MOONEY, supra note 104, at 28-29. 
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though there is obviously a great deal of controversy about how to understand 
what the Constitution means by “establishment” and “free exercise,” the outer 
limits of the terms, that is, the applications on which almost everyone agrees, go 
a great distance toward declawing public religious disputes.  On the establish-
ment side, the Constitution removes the most powerful incentives for religious 
groups to try to gain control of the state.  On the free exercise side, even under 
the flawed regime of Employment Division, Department of Human Resources of 
Oregon v. Smith,136 the Constitution protects minority religious groups from the 
most egregious sorts of abuses.137  Some of the more alarming predictions by 
proponents of restrictive conceptions of public reason lose their bite with the 
Religion Clauses operating in the background.138  The existence of the Religion 
Clauses therefore takes some of the pressure off the discussions of the role of 
religion in public discourse and reduces the risks to social peace of adopting a 
relatively laissez faire position on public reason.139   
V.  CONCLUSION 
Proponents of public reason tend to treat the elimination of the divisive-
ness of religion (or other nonpublic argument) from public deliberation as an 
unmitigated good.140  But, as models of public deliberation consistent with the 
happy story of pluralism demonstrate, the exclusion of religious points of view 
is not without its potential costs.  By pushing religious speech and thought to the 
margins, public reason may prevent certain important discussions from ever 
taking place and may undermine the beneficial impacts of pluralism on those 
that do. 
Whether, from the point of view of stability and deliberative outcomes, 
the negative consequences of exclusion outweigh its benefits is, ultimately, a 
difficult empirical question.  The debate over public reason, however, has taken 
place in the nearly complete absence of any real empirical inquiry or discussion.  
Without solid evidence, we can only speculate, but it is at least plausible to sup-
pose that the negative consequences for stability and deliberation of excluding 
(and encumbering) religious voices might outweigh the benefits.  In short, it 
may well turn out that, at the end of the day, a mere modus vivendi might be 
more stable than a true overlapping consensus. 
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 494 U.S. 872 (1990). 
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 See Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 532 (1993) (“At 
minimum, the protections of the Free Exercise Clause pertains if the law is at issue discriminates 
against some or all religious beliefs or prohibits conduct because it is undertaken for religious 
reasons.”). 
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 See Shiffrin, supra note 47, at 1645 (arguing that in order for religion to become a destabi-
lizing force, the Constitution would have to be changed in fundamental ways). 
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 See id. 
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 But see Solum, supra note 14, at 748-49. 
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The happier story about the relationship between diversity and pluralism 
seems to lend itself to what scholars have described as a “laissez faire” position 
within the debate over public reason, at least with respect to political discourse 
by normal citizens and, perhaps, by legislators.141  The happy story does not, of 
course, mandate that position.  This is in part because of the tentativeness of its 
empirical foundations, but it is also because the happy story is not responsive to 
the arguments about legitimacy raised by public reason’s proponents.   
As I noted at the outset, I am sympathetic with arguments other theorists 
have raised against the accounts of legitimacy on which the more restrictive 
theories of public reason rely.  But my purpose in writing this paper was to nar-
rowly explore the relationship between public reason and stability, and, at least 
on that score, the case for the salience of the happy story does call into question 
the claims that theorists of public reason have made about the destabilizing ef-
fects of religious discourse within the public conversation.  Consequently, and 
as Waldron has suggested, the happy story at a minimum cautions us against 
reflexively supporting broad restrictions on religious participation in public dis-
course, particularly if we do so in the hope of avoiding social conflict.142  
As I have argued in this paper, content-based restrictions on participa-
tion in public debates might well have the opposite effect from what their pro-
ponents expect.  They might degrade public debate and polarize political posi-
tions, rather than enhancing the quality of deliberation and bringing people to-
gether.  Perhaps legitimacy-focused proponents of public reason will view the 
risk of such deliberative harm to be a price worth paying to realize their concep-
tion of political justice, but it is a price that they should at least acknowledge in 
their analyses, even if only to disregard it in the end. 
 
  
141
 The details of the application of such a model of public reason, and its fit with possible 
readings of the Establishment Clause, are beyond my ambitions for this essay.  Suffice it to say 
that I agree with efforts to resist the exclusion of overtly religious argument from legislative de-
bate, although I am sympathetic with the exclusion, on establishment grounds, of overtly religious 
reasons from the official “acts” of government bodies, including legislatures.  I would therefore 
support the prohibition of explicitly religious appeals from “whereas” clauses and legislative 
histories. 
142
 See Waldron, supra note 54, at 837. 
 
